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forthcoming in « globalizations » 
— he implosion of popular struggles against the erosion of economic and democratic rights in 
the Middle East has thrown into sharp relief the co-constitutive character of neoliberal re-
forms and authoritarian state practices. his article zooms in on this relationship, and traces 
the consolidation of a core component of authoritarian statisms by examining how the ruling 
AKP government in Turkey has facilitated executive centralization. his process refers to a 
form of state restructuring whereby key decision-making powers are increasingly concen-
trated in the hands of the central government while democratic avenues to contest govern-
ment policies are curtailed through legal and administrative reforms, and the marginaliza-
tion of dissident social forces. I unpack the mechanisms of executive centralization in Turkey 
by exploring the transformation of urban governance under AKP rule, which has promoted a 
spectacular degree of state-led commodiication of land and housing while simultaneously 
recentralizing key decision-making powers. he investigation demonstrates that executive 
centralization in urban governance has paved the way for the swit implementation of con-
tested urban transformation projects marked by a non-participatory approach to urban ‘re-
newal’, the reconiguration of the state’s redistributive function vis-à-vis low-income house-
holds, and a tendency to exacerbate existing patterns of inequalities via the housing market. 
AKP ▪︎  executive centralization ▪︎  housing policy ▪︎  neoliberalism ▪︎  urban governance ▪ ︎
Turkey 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Introduction 
Summer 2013 in Turkey was marked by an eruption of mass uprisings following an initial occupa-
tion aimed at the protection of green space in downtown Istanbul. he Gezi Park protests quickly 
spread throughout the whole country and mobilized an estimated 2.5 million participants in 79 
provinces out of a total 81 (Amnesty International, 2013, p. 56). he rapidly developing wave of 
mobilization succeeded in bringing together a distinct coalition of social forces, which expanded 
the parameters of the protests to incorporate a set of broader issues related to the ruling Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) government’s dubitable approach to democratic rights and accountabili-
ty, economic development and public participation. his sustained and widespread mobilization, 
combined with the government’s heavy-handed response to the protests, received considerable in-
ternational attention and helped highlight what some considered the AKP’s ‘authoritarian 
turn’ (Benhabib, 2013). While the AKP government’s harsh response was, indeed, emblematic of a 
single-party rule that tolerated little opposition both in and outside the parliament, the violent 
spectacle of the state repression displayed at Gezi captures only a single facet of a broader govern-
ing logic of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ that had long deined the AKP era (Tansel, 2018a). As 
such, it is necessary to contextualize Turkey’s ‘authoritarian turn’ against the background of the 
systematic, yet perhaps less perceptible, transformations wrought in the fabric of the country’s legal, 
administrative and bureaucratic mechanisms. 
 In order to contribute to recent discussions on the linkages between neoliberalism and authori-
tarian state practices across various socio-spatial contexts, here I argue that the AKP has relied on a 
high degree of political re-centralization, which operates in conjunction with—not in spite of—its 
wholehearted adoption of a neoliberal macroeconomic programme (see also Cozzolino in this spe-
cial issue). his centralization not only privileged the executive as the sole arbiter of social and eco-
nomic policy at various levels of governance, but also facilitated the party’s increasingly recognized 
authoritarian drive by systematically blocking democratic and popular avenues for contesting its 
policies. I substantiate this argument by exploring the sweeping reorganization of the policy 
frameworks and institutions of urban governance with particular focus on the Housing Develop-
ment Administration of Turkey (hereater will be referred to as TOKİ, and the Administration). 
Analyzing the Administration’s trajectory under the aegis of AKP rule provides us a productive 
avenue with which to disentangle the broader processes of executive centralization, whereby AKP-
authored reform strategies have resulted in the domination of central-decision making bodies over 
residents, regulatory bodies and other stakeholders. 
 his argument is leshed out through an analysis of the legislation produced or revised by AKP 
governments, which is then contrasted with a set of ethnographic insights on urban transformation 
projects compiled from the existing critical literature on urban governance. As the paper’s primary 
aim is unpacking the legal and administrative facets of executive centralization, ethnographic mate-
rial from urban transformation projects is harnessed as an auxiliary resource and the indings uti-
lized from the literature are cross-referenced with multiple sources. Methodologically, while the 
paper is deeply rooted in the extant discussions on Turkish neoliberalism, it contributes to our un-
derstanding of the relationship between neoliberalism and authoritarianism in other contexts (see 
also numerous papers in this special issue, especially those by Jenss and Kreitmeyr). he paper also 
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highlights that a greater emphasis on unpacking this particular relationship is necessary to study 
similar cases of democratic debilitation that are commonly discussed under the aegis of democratic 
backsliding (see Tansel, 2018). 
 In the irst section below, I provide an overview of the AKP-led neoliberalization and a prelimi-
nary conceptual map to highlight the linkages between executive centralization and neoliberalism, 
with particular reference to the transformation of urban governance. his is followed by an analysis 
of the sweeping legal and administrative reforms enacted by AKP governments in urban policy, 
which have greatly increased the competencies of TOKİ and restructured the Administration as the 
executive’s arm in facilitating urban transformation projects. he inal section offers a panoramic 
look at the ways in which the legal and administrative reforms have shaped urban transformation 
projects in the AKP era, and how these contested projects ended up commodifying land and hous-
ing while reproducing the extant lines of inequalities faced by the urban poor and low-income 
households that they were ostensibly designed to assist. 
Executive centralization and neoliberalism in the urban frontier 
Before detailing the transformation of urban governance in Turkey, it is important to briely re-
count the parameters of the AKP-led neoliberalization, as it was against this background that the 
party instrumentalized urban transformation as an engine of economic growth and stability, and 
relied on a renewed TOKİ-driven agenda of public-private partnerships to commodify housing and 
land across the country. 
 he AKP assumed office in 2002 following the inability of a centrist coalition to resolve the twin 
crises of neoliberalization which fully broke out in the economic and political realms in 2000-2001. 
Instead of mounting a challenge to the principles of liberalization that underpinned the preceding 
decade of economic instability, the irst AKP administration largely adopted a set of prescriptions 
provided by the IMF, and the successive governments have prioritized inlation targeting, iscal 
austerity and a considerably broadened privatization programme (Yeldan & Ünüvar, 2015, pp. 
15-16). hese policy priorities have resulted in a macroeconomic balance sheet that boasts inlation 
reduction, high FDI inlows generated by speculative capital movements, an initial period of high 
GDP growth rates, and improvements in GDP per capita. he inal two benchmarks mirror the 
coeval performance of many other ‘emerging countries’ rather than signal an exceptional feat (see 
Tansel, 2017a). Yet, despite the ot-overstated assessments of this performance, the AKP pro-
gramme has failed to tackle unemployment and chart a route out of the country’s trajectory of ‘job-
less growth’ (Yeldan & Ercan, 2011). he aggressive labour market restructuring pursued by AKP 
governments has placed considerable constraints on the prospects of wage increases for most work-
ers, while simultaneously buttressing the employers’ ability to shrink employment rights (Bozkurt-
Güngen, 2018). Coupled with the rapid expansion of the scope and availability of inancial prod-
ucts, wage stagnation has precipitated a record level of household indebtedness whereby ‘household 
debt reached 41% of disposable personal income in 2010, implying a 6-fold increase since the end 
of 2003’ (Karaçimen, 2015, p. 752). 
 As many observers have noted, cities have not only played an instrumental role in the AKP’s 
ability to undertake key pillars of its economic programme, but they have also become the concrete 
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arenas for the party to demonstrate the apparent ‘success’ of its policy initiatives and its ability to 
‘serve’ the people (Balaban, 2011). he urgently-needed capital inlows required by the rapid 
growth model propelled a search for new spaces to valorize and direct investment into, while the 
construction sector experienced a drastic expansion, thanks in no small part to the urban renewal 
and transformation projects devised and distributed by an increasingly ambitious TOKİ. TOKİ-
initiated public-private partnerships effectively refashioned the Administration’s operation as a ‘cat-
alyst for the private sector’ (Atasoy, 2016, p. 671), a role explicitly championed by the Administra-
tion itself (TOKİ, 2011, p. 7). 
 TOKİ projects are responsible for 9.2% of Turkey’s annual housing production. Between 2003 
and September 2017, building permits for more than 2 billion m2 were issued to facilitate the con-
struction of approximately 1.7 million new buildings (TÜİK, n.d. A; Figure 1). Between 2003 and 
2016, the Administration itself initiated the construction of 737,136 housing units with a stated aim 
to complete a total of 1.2 million units by 2013 (TOKİ, 2016, p. 10). his spectacular investment in 
built environment and state-supervised housing initiatives have propelled the construction indus-
try to constitute an important share of the country’s overall GDP—8.9% in 2016—and to grow by 
an average of 5.9% annually between 2003 and 2014 (Daily Sabah, 2017; Erol & Unal, 2015, p. 9). It 
is within this context that the role of the construction sector and the urbanization of capital have 
gained prominence as explanans of the AKP’s hegemony, leading some scholars to establish a posi-
tive causal relationship between the AKP’s housing policy and the party’s electoral performance 
(see Marschall et al., 2016). AKP cadres have also utilized the demonstrable transformation of cities 
with new spaces of consumption, housing and ‘megaprojects’ as direct evidence of the government’s 
ability to modernize and transform the country, a strategy that aimed to appeal both to the Turkish 
electorate and the international capital that the government was keen to attract. 
 While the AKP’s agency in prioritizing this programme of economic development through ur-
ban transformation is undeniable, the socio-economic processes that facilitated this model should 
be linked both to earlier trends in urbanization in Turkey as well as to the systemic pressures gener-
ated by the country’s uneven liberalization. Rapid commodiication of public land and the expan-
sion of the real estate market under AKP rule were made possible by a proactive government policy 
that heavily relied on the state’s expropriation and planning powers, and also by the antecedent, 
intensiied urbanization of capital in the 1980s and 1990s. As Louis Moreno (2014, p. 259) eluci-
dates: 
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Figure 1. Total area of construction permits issued, 2003-2017 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute. 
Available at: http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=609
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urbanisation represented endless scope for capital to open up new channels of exploitation outside the 
closed ield of the workplace. he city, comprising a fabric of social assets saturated with value, provided 
a space in which capitalism could re-fortify itself, through restructuring the ownership of the relations of 
production, consumption and collective consumption. 
In Turkey, this process corresponded to a larger shit in economic management from import-sub-
stitution industrialization to neoliberalism, whereby the state’s half-hearted attempts to regulate 
urbanization and the irregular housing stock began to clash with ‘the emergence of entrepreneurial 
local government acting as a market facilitator, and the privatization of various municipal services 
such as transportation, housing, and provision of natural gas’ (Bartu-Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008, p. 
12). hroughout the 1990s, the planned spaces of production and consumption increasingly in-
fringed on public land in desired residential and commercial locations as well as on gecekondu 
neighbourhoods,  while the perceived function of urban land—from the perspective of both capital 1
and the state—changed from being an ‘an instrument to accommodate the growing labouring 
classes’ to ‘a new area of economic investment open to both national and international 
capital’ (Saraçoğlu & Demirtaş-Milz, 2014, p. 192). 
 Yet the trend towards a greater concentration of capital in cities and a more permissive policy 
environment did not trigger the type of large-scale transformation and housing projects that now 
marks the AKP era. For example, between 1984 (the year the Mass Housing Fund was established) 
and 2002, the total area for which construction permits were granted was approximately 1.2 billion 
m2—roughly the same area for the construction permits issued only in Istanbul between 2003 and 
2014 (Çavuşoğlu & Strutz, 2014, p. 142). Between 1984 and 2002, the average loor area for granted 
construction permits per annum roughly amounted to 64.6 million m2, whereas the same igure 
more than doubled to approximately 143 m2 during the AKP’s fourteen-year rule (2003-2017) 
(TÜİK, n.d. B; Figure 1 & 2). 
 his picture compels us to zoom in on the methods and mechanisms particular to the AKP-led 
state apparatuses and on the initiatives undertaken by the government since 2002. In addition to 
the availability of cheap credit, the AKP’s key ‘success’ was its ability to deploy state apparatuses to 
facilitate and shelter capital lows. In effect, the policies have shepherded domestic and foreign capi-
tal lows into what David Harvey (1985, pp. 6-7) termed ‘the secondary circuit of capital’, which 
consists of ‘long-term assets, particularly those constituting the built environment’. Harvey suggest-
ed that the movement of capital from the ‘irst circuit’ (comprising activities that produce surplus 
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Figure 2. Total area of construction permits issued, 1984-2002  
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute. 
Available at: http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=2010
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value) into the ‘second’ functions as a temporary displacement of the crisis tendencies of overac-
cumulation. Yet, this ‘switching’ between the circuits poses signiicant problems for individual capi-
talists, and Harvey indicated that it would be a feasible option only if a ‘functioning capital market’ 
and ‘a state willing to inance and guarantee long-term, large-scale projects with respect to the cre-
ation of the built environment’ existed (ibid., p. 7). My contention here is that AKP governments 
have effectively fulilled this role by manoeuvring the Turkish state to become a facilitator of large-
scale urban transformation and housing projects that both absorbed surplus capital—as Harvey’s 
theory presumes it would—and heightened the scope and pace of the commodiication of land 
through land and property transfer (see also Bruff & Starnes in this special issue on the importance 
of remaking households to neoliberalism). 
 It is crucial to underscore that this process was made possible by a signiicant transformation of 
the state’s administrative and legal branches in managing urban governance, as well as the deploy-
ment of its coercive apparatuses to secure the continuation of contested projects. he main mecha-
nism I highlight here is executive centralization, which, in this particular context, refers to the de-
gree to which the key decision-making powers in urban governance have been transferred to the 
central government through the empowerment of TOKİ—which operates under the Prime Min-
istry—and the legislative changes that have granted extraordinary expropriation powers to the state 
and invalidated the inluence of relevant auditing and regulatory authorities, residents and civil 
society groups. 
 his trend towards ‘centralization’, rather than constituting an exception to an assumed neolib-
eral logic of ‘marketization’ or the privileging of private actors, enables further commodiication 
while also signalling the importance of certain mechanisms that distinguish the Turkish case from 
some well-established examples of neoliberal urbanization. For example, Swyngedouw et al.’s (2002, 
p. 561) inluential work on neoliberal urban policy in the European Union (EU) asserts that neolib-
eral urbanization is deined by a degree of institutional fragmentation whereby the ‘formal govern-
ment structures’ are ‘subordinated to new institutions and agencies, oten paralleled by a signiicant 
redistribution of policymaking powers, competencies, and responsibilities’. he case studies they 
cite suggest that neoliberal urbanization shits the onus from public input to experts and a ‘fusion 
of technical, economic, and political elites’, and it reduces the ‘role of the public in general and of 
traditional organized groups in particular, with a consequent loss of democratic accountability’ (p. 
579). 
 While the Turkish case mirrors many of these processes, it is important to highlight the follow-
ing two qualiiers. First, the restructuring of urban governance during the AKP-led neoliberaliza-
tion have not only excluded public participation in the design and implementation of large-scale 
projects, but it has also minimized the role of critical expertise. Centralization has consolidated and 
expanded the arms of the executive in shaping key decision-making processes, and has built a legal 
and administrative irewall around the urban transformation projects that many independent ex-
perts and professional associations have attempted to contest—all of which represent instances of 
‘preemptive discipline’ (Tansel, 2017b, pp. 3-5; Bruff, 2014, p. 123). his does not contradict the 
overall thesis of Swyngedouw et al., as they also underline that the fragmented governance forged 
by neoliberal urbanization leads to ‘the adoption of discretionary forms of management’, and it 
helps create ‘the conditions for the establishment of centralized and more autocratic’ forms of deci-
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sion-making (2002, p. 570). Nevertheless, the speciicities of the Turkish case require some adjust-
ment to the original argument. 
 Second, ‘centralization’ in the Turkish case does not necessarily refer to a complete reversal of 
the devolution of decision-making powers to local government. Many instances of administrative 
reform enacted by the AKP—particularly those that were propelled by EU accession negotiations in 
the irst decade of AKP rule—explicitly aimed at furnishing greater powers to local authorities. 
Metropolitan Municipality Law No. 5216 and Municipality Law No. 5393 are clear examples of this 
orientation, as they both removed a number of central government controls over municipalities 
and encouraged the participation of civil society groups in local government initiatives (Bartu-
Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008, p. 13; Lelandais, 2014, pp. 1792-1793; Doğan & Stupar, 2017, p. 283). 
Yet the AKP’s administrative restructuring has failed to produce a tangible decentralized structure 
of power at local and regional levels; or in other words, the reforms that were supposed to facilitate 
a transfer of authority, power and control to local governments rarely amounted to a genuine insti-
tutional restructuring. Despite broad-ranging changes in municipal laws, the central government 
and its affiliated bodies (e.g. TOKİ) have not relinquished their intervention powers; on the con-
trary, in most cases, they ended up extending their control over local authorities. Correspondingly, 
various local administration reforms have increasingly amounted to ‘step towards strengthening the 
power of TOKİ while weakening that of local governments’ (Kayasü & Yetişkul, 2014, p. 217; Bayır-
bağ, 2013). 
 Executive centralization has also reinforced the state’s tendency to deploy coercion, and has 
resulted in the marginalization of public and non-governmental scrutiny of urban governance. As 
Annalena Di Giovanni (2017, p. 111) notes, coercion within the context of rapid urban transforma-
tion denotes a palpable increase in the scope and deployment of the state’s repressive apparatuses, 
and ‘a preemptive governance capable of legally restricting decision-making and auditing mecha-
nisms. As polities must sustain the market of development investments and economic growth, poli-
cies are bound to restrict participation and accountability’. he expansion of the state’s expropria-
tion powers and TOKİ’s exclusion from regulatory oversight have largely shielded urban transfor-
mation projects from legal contestation, while the heavy presence of the state’s coercive apparatuses 
have aimed to minimize social mobilization against the projects. 
Establishing the mechanisms of preemptive discipline in urban governance 
his section examines how the AKP’s legal and administrative reforms have repurposed TOKİ to 
function as an agent of land and property transfer, and how these changes have been instrumental 
in reinforcing the overall trend of executive centralization in public policy under AKP rule. TOKİ 
was established in 1984 with the stated aim of facilitating state-backed inancing to housing 
projects. he Mass Housing Law of 1984,  which deined the parameters of the Administration’s 2
responsibilities, was envisioned as a potential panacea for the state’s inability to expand housing 
provision for low-income families. Previous state-led efforts were largely deined by policies that 
prioritized offering subsidized credit, which oten received criticism due to their tendency to con-
tribute ‘more to the development of middle-class and even luxurious residential construction than 
to the realization of social housing projects’ (Buğra, 1998, p. 308). 
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TOKİ’s second incarnation under AKP rule was facilitated by a series of sweeping legal and admin-
istrative changes that radically enhanced the Administration’s planning and inancial powers while 
also bringing its operation under the full control of the executive. hese reforms have given TOKİ 
the ability to expand considerably the scope of its projects, while also situating the Administration 
in the housing market as a ‘private enterprise’ as well as the regulator and facilitator of public-pri-
vate partnerships in large-scale urban transformation and housing projects (Kayasü & Yetişkul, 
2014, p. 216; Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p. 1485). Correspondingly, TOKİ’s share of the housing market 
rose from 1.1% in 2003 to 18.6% within four years (Karaman, 2013, p. 3418), while the value of its 
housing investments at the municipal level reached $11 billion by 2014 (Marschall et al., 2016, p. 
202). 
 he AKP’s ambitious efforts to place urban transformation at the heart of its socio-economic 
programme began as early as 2003, with the passing of key legislation that considerably expanded 
TOKİ’s competencies and attached the Administration more closely to the government. Law No. 
4966 amended the Mass Housing Law of 1984 (Law No. 2985) and extended the responsibilities of 
the Administration to include the ‘provision of individual and collective credit for housing…i-
nancing projects that aim to regenerate gecekondu areas, [and] to protect and restore historical and 
local architecture’.  TOKİ was also granted the option to request the ownership of treasury land 3
designated to be used in its own projects without any compensation, subject to the approval of the 
Prime Minister. With Law No. 5018 on the management of public inances, TOKİ’s accounts were 
reallocated to a ‘special budget’, thus removed from the Turkish Court of Accounts’ auditing remit.  4
Shortly ater this, the Administration itself was removed from the control of the Ministry of Public 
Works and Housing, and attached directly to the Prime Minister’s office.  5
 2004-2008 represents a key juncture in urban governance in Turkey, as a series of laws passed in 
this period continued to expand TOKİ’s powers. Law No. 5162 empowered the Administration to 
design and develop urban transformation projects, but also the authority to claim eminent domain, 
and thus the ability to expropriate any land or property owned by real or legal entities.  TOKİ 6
gained the license to prepare and inance urban transformation projects in gecekondu neighbour-
hoods with a view to ‘evacuating or reclaiming them through rejuvenation’. With Law No. 5162, the 
Administration was also authorized to establish partnerships with private companies, which would 
underpin its revenue-sharing partnership programme in the years to come. 
 Law No. 5273 strengthened the Administration’s grip on public land by abolishing the Urban 
Land Office, ‘which was formerly responsible for the development and allocation of urban land 
according to the needs of different institutions and local governments’ (Türkün, 2011, p. 70), and 
transferring 64.5 million m2 of public land to the TOKİ’s own portfolio.  An amendment made to 7
Law No. 775 in 2007 enabled TOKİ to take ownership of treasury lands without compensation.  8
Law No. 5366, ostensibly designed to protect and restore dilapidated buildings of historic impor-
tance, incorporated major conservation sites into the purview of urban transformation projects.  9
Directly empowering municipalities in implementing urban transformation projects in such areas, 
the law dismantled the regulations on ‘historical and protection zones’, and exposed these sites to 
the prospect of expropriation (Kuyucu, 2014, p. 616n.7; Çavuşoğlu & Strutz, 2014, p. 143; Kayasü & 
Yetişkul, 2016, p. 217). 
 he contingent empowerment of local authorities—in conjunction with the ongoing expansion 
of TOKİ—continued with Municipal Law of 2005 (No. 5393). Municipalities’ competencies vis-à-
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vis urban transformation projects had already been enhanced with Law No. 5216 in 2004; but the 
2005 law introduced a key new criterion for expanding the scope of urban transformation by enti-
tling the municipalities with the authority to implement urban transformation projects to ‘rebuild 
and restore decaying parts of the city’.  As Kuyucu (2014, p. 615) notes, the law ‘speciies no con10 -
crete deinitions or objective criteria of obsolescence, decay or dilapidation that should serve as the 
basis for designating areas as “transformation zones”’, and this deliberate ambiguity ‘opens up a 
dangerous degree of arbitrariness in decision making for municipal authorities’ (see also Tepe, 
2016, p. 77). hese measures were designed to be implemented in partnership with TOKİ and did 
not amount to any systematic realignment towards institutional decentralization. Further pieces of 
legislation passed in this same four-year period demonstrate clearly that the AKP’s approach to 
decentralization was highly contingent and did not aim to disassemble the central government’s 
control over key decision-making mechanisms. For example, Law No. 5793, passed in July 2008, 
readjusted the scope of local government regulation in urban transformation projects and stipulat-
ed that TOKİ can authorize its own projects even if they are not approved by local authorities.  11
 Space does not permit a full exploration of all attempts to expand the scope of TOKİ’s expropri-
atory powers and the public land available for urban transformation projects. However, two further 
key reforms should be briely highlighted before unpacking how urban transformation projects are 
developed in practice. he irst concerns the AKP’s successful bid in 2012 to redeine the legal sta-
tus of forests. Effectively revoking the pre-existing constitutional guarantees that protected forested 
areas from commercial use, Law No. 6292 legalized the sale of ‘lands that have lost their “forest” 
status (due to burning and cutting of trees)’ (Atasoy, 2016, p. 662).  By 2014, the state had com12 -
pleted cadastral work on the majority of lands that fell under this category and sold 1.573 million 
m2 lands out of a total 3.45 million m2 (Atasoy, 2016, p. 662). Commodiication of forest lands was 
accompanied by a twin act which was promulgated in the same year. Law No. 6306 was presented 
by the government as a state-led effort to increase cities’ resilience to disasters and to strengthen 
building codes and regulations, yet it neatly it into the existing trend towards executive centraliza-
tion by empowering the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization and TOKİ in designating ‘risk 
areas’, which would then be earmarked for urban transformation projects under the guidance of the 
Administration.  he law enforced a highly ambiguous deinition of ‘risk areas’, which includes 13
speciic buildings and zones under immediate ‘disaster risk’ and those in the proximity of such ar-
eas as well, thus allowing the Ministry and TOKİ to subject ‘hypothetically all existing building 
stock’ to the jurisdiction of the law (Eliçin, 2014, p. 151). 
 Broader reforms enacted by AKP governments have also had a signiicant impact on urban gov-
ernance, as they have transformed the state’s approach to informal housing. he new Criminal 
Code, passed in 2004, criminalized the construction of gecekondu housing for the irst time and 
made it punishable by a ive-year prison sentence.  Given the historical role gecekondus played in 14
facilitating access to housing for the urban poor and the state’s permissive approach to informal 
housing, criminalization was a major step in redeining the state’s redistributive function vis-à-vis 
low-income households as well as its commitment to codifying, and further commodifying, land 
and housing (see also Jenss in this special issue). he law has resulted in the escalation of discipli-
nary measures directed at gecekondu areas, which took the form of widespread demolitions of 
whole neighbourhoods and increased surveillance and policing (Lelandais, 2014, pp. 1793-1794).  15
he law also made the gecekondu neighbourhoods prime targets for TOKİ projects: the Adminis-
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tration was empowered to impose large-scale urban transformation projects in such areas and 
sought to transform them due to their high ‘rent gap’, i.e. ‘the disparity between the potential 
ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalized under the present land use’ (Smith, 1996, p. 
65; Karaman, 2014, p. 294; Saraçoğlu & Demirtaş-Milz, 2014, p. 179). 
Reproducing authoritarian neoliberalism through urban governance 
he above-discussed legal and administrative reforms in urban governance reveal the gradual as-
sembly of an infrastructure that reinforced executive centralization under AKP rule, yet examining 
how these changes were relected in urban transformation projects exposes an even more drastic 
realignment of the state’s productive and regulatory role in cities, and its relationship with the ur-
ban poor and various fractions of capital. his section will unpack the ways in which the AKP’s 
authoritarian neoliberal rule has manifested in urban governance by reviewing a series of snapshots 
taken from TOKİ’s major urban transformation projects. he aim of this exercise is to establish how 
urban transformation projects have (I) limited popular participation by adopting a top-down ap-
proach; (II) intensiied existing inequalities in the housing market; (III) displaced residents from 
their long-established spaces of social reproduction; (IV) exploited class and ethnicity-based divi-
sions and deepened ‘territorial stigmatization’; and (V) constituted a form of preemptive discipline 
by preventing (and, if necessary, violating) legal and social challenges mounted against the projects. 
 One of the most immediate effects of the way in which executive centralization has taken hold 
of urban governance is the degree to which key decision-making processes have been transferred to 
TOKİ and the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization at the expense of local authorities, resi-
dents, and civil society groups. As highlighted above, this trend emerged against the background of 
ostensible empowerment of municipalities to develop and implement urban transformation 
projects while their competencies were, in practice, regularly subjugated to the demands of TOKİ. 
Instead of producing an institutional structure capable of relecting the needs of local authorities 
and populations, the reforms have placed the ‘implementation of urban regeneration projects in the 
hands of central government from the beginning (land development and planning) to the end 
(property development and redistribution of property rights)’ (Eraydın & Taşan-Kok, 2014, p. 119). 
 he ramiications of the AKP’s top-down approach to urban governance can be traced in the 
way in which major transformation projects were conducted by the relevant local authorities and 
TOKİ, which are ‘typically announced without any prior consultation with the locals and have re-
sulted in the involuntary displacement of residents who have no right or means to participate in 
renewal schemes’ (Erensü & Karaman, 2017, p. 26). he urban transformation project that aimed to 
‘regenerate’ the neighbourhood of Sulukule in Istanbul embodies the contradictions of the AKP’s 
contingent decentralization. Developed by TOKİ, the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and the 
local Fatih Municipality, the project began with an ‘urgent expropriation decree’ issued by the cen-
tral government (Karaman, 2014, p. 296). While on paper the project aimed at the ‘conservation of 
Sulukule’—a historic neighbourhood with a well-established majority Roma community—it was 
implemented without any substantial engagement with the residents, and widely criticized for the 
absence of participatory mechanisms that could integrate the needs and demands of the local pop-
ulation (Uysal, 2012, p. 16). A similar approach shaped the urban transformation project of the 
 9
Reproducing Authoritarian Neoliberalism
Fikirtepe neighbourhood in Istanbul, whose residents resisted the resettlement plans proposed by 
the TOKİ’s private contractors. he project could only proceed ater the central government in-
voked Law No. 6306 to declare Fikirtepe a ‘risk area’, thereby preempting and undermining the res-
idents’ efforts to mount legal and social challenges (Tepe, 2016, p. 88). 
 While TOKİ repeatedly underscores that the ‘social housing projects’ constitute the majority of 
its housing production (85.2%),  the development and implementation of these urban transforma16 -
tion projects serve to reproduce extant inequalities in access to housing. he projects’ inability to 
offer substantial solutions to the existing lines of stratiication in housing stems from both the high-
ly inancialized and non-participatory nature of the projects, and the speciic history of the devel-
opment of informal housing in Turkey. he gecekondu neighbourhoods that have been targeted by 
the TOKİ’s ‘renewal’ projects proliferated within a context of uneven urbanization in and migration 
to the metropolitan areas in the second half of the twentieth century. Flows of migrant workers to 
the cities sustained the state’s and the developing industries’ labour needs, and successive govern-
ments’ permissive approach to informal housing on public land—which gave birth to the gecekondu 
neighbourhoods—effectively helped them keep labour costs down (Lelandais, 2014, p. 1792; Kara-
man, 2014, p. 296). With the passing of amnesty laws in 1984 and 1985, the occupiers of gecekondu 
properties started claiming legal ownership and use rights through the state’s land titling initiatives. 
hese legal reforms spawned what Tahire Erman (2001, p. 987) has called the ‘apartmentalisation of 
gecekondus’, whereby ‘the once-owner-occupied/owner-built gecekondus were [replaced] by high-
rise apartment buildings in which the owner of the gecekondu land owned several apartments’. 
hose gecekondu residents who were able to access title deeds and legalize their ownership status 
thus proited from either selling their piece of once-public land or further developing their proper-
ties into larger units—a process which ‘created a lucrative and hierarchical market structure that 
disproportionately beneits the more economically resourceful and better politically connected in-
habitants’ (Kuyucu, 2014, pp. 618-619; Enlil, 2011, p. 20). 
 TOKİ’s urban transformation projects exploited these legal ambiguities of informal housing 
tenure, and exacerbated the already stratiied relationship between gecekondu tenants who lacked 
legal claims and protections, and those who owned titles or use rights. In most transformation 
projects, ‘legal’ residents of the targeted neighbourhoods, i.e. those who can prove their ownership 
or use rights, retain the option to stay in the same area and move into a new-build TOKİ unit. he 
residents who opt for this scenario are required to pay a sum which is calculated as the difference 
between the value of their existing property and the value of the new TOKİ unit they would own. 
his arrangement thus offers ‘the promise of acquiring a house with a signiicantly higher market 
value, and in the case of gecekondu settlers, the transition to formal ownership status’ (Karaman, 
2014, p. 297). 
 he translation of this arrangement into practice means that gecekondu tenants who lack estab-
lished legal rights are not eligible for compensation, and oten ‘face direct eviction’ (Karaman, 2014, 
p. 297). In the case of the Sulukule project, many tenants who could not afford the payment plan 
imposed by the project ended up abrogating their resettlement rights and selling their ‘entitlement’ 
to the new TOKİ properties to third parties (Uysal, 2012, p. 17; Karaman, 2014, p. 299). Meanwhile, 
residents who already possessed ownership rights had the opportunity to sell their properties at 
high proit margins (Uysal, 2012, p. 17). As such, the projects’ promise of home-ownership oten 
applies to those who already enjoyed secure tenures via the possession of deeds or use rights, while 
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tenants who lacked such legal claims are further pushed to a perpetual state of ‘rental housing inse-
curity’ (cf. Soederberg, 2018). 
 he exclusion of residents from participation in the planning and implementation of these 
projects, as well as the differential rights of resettlement possessed by owners and tenants, further 
serve to reproduce inequalities by displacing residents from their long-established communities 
and workplaces. he exclusionary effects oten manifest in economic terms, as many resettled resi-
dents—particularly those who were tenants prior to resettlement—struggle to keep up with the 
mortgage payments and end up selling or leasing their new lats. Beyond this secondary cycle of 
displacement necessitated by economic hardship, the former residents of transformed neighbour-
hoods also face exclusion from their established spaces of reproduction. For example, Sulukule ten-
ants were given the option to resettle in Taşoluk, a neighbourhood ‘40 km outside the city 
center’ (Karaman, 2014, p. 299), an unpopular alternative that was accepted by few residents. As 
Karaman (2014. p. 299) notes, ‘almost all of the tenants had moved to smaller substandard houses 
in the immediate vicinity of Sulukule or were pushed further away from the city center’. Likewise, 
the resettlement plan implemented in Kadifekale envisioned that the residents would be moved to a 
peripheral suburb ‘isolated from the economic and social opportunities on offer in the 
city’ (Saraçoğlu & Demirtaş-Milz, 2014, pp. 181-182). 
 In addition to the difficulty of maintaining access to their workplaces ater resettlement, resi-
dents have faced the prospect of being physically cut off from their established ‘mutual assistance 
networks’, which have been crucial in reinforcing the urban poor’s ability to reproduce themselves 
outside the ‘formal’ framework of social reproduction via market mechanisms (Lelandais, 2014, p. 
1798). As noted by ethnographic evidence, resettled residents have oten lost access to informal 
practices that hitherto had increased their ability to purchase basic necessities (e.g. such as veresiye, 
a type of deferred payments commonly practiced in neighbourhood shops), and the stringently 
ordered TOKİ units built without the residents’ input—and oten administered by private compa-
nies—have resulted in the destruction of communal spaces where residents used to grow their own 
produce (Bartu-Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008, p. 23). Simultaneously, there is growing evidence that 
resettled residents are attempting to ‘reappropriate’ these highly regulated and managed spaces to 
re-establish their everyday practices (Erman, 2016). 
 his consistent attempt to order informal spaces and submit them to the state’s logic of formal-
izing property relations has also been reinforced by an explicit securitarian discourse which has 
exploited class and ethnicity based differences to legitimize urban transformation (see also Jenss in 
this special issue). Public relations campaigns surrounding the urban transformation projects asso-
ciated the targeted areas as zones of criminality and a general sense of urban decay, thus reinforcing 
an existing trend of ‘territorial stigmatization’ whereby ‘discourses of viliication proliferate[d]’ 
about neighbourhoods that had already been marked by a ‘pervasive stigmata of poverty’ (Wac-
quant, 1996, p. 125). his discourse manifested repeatedly in the statements and speeches of igures 
and authorities that played a key role in the projects. For example, in 2006, the then-Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan described gecekondu neighbourhoods as a ‘tumor that has surrounded our 
cities’ and highlighted that ‘removing this tumor’ was the government’s main priority (quoted in 
Kuyucu, 2014, pp. 613-614). he transformation of neighbourhoods with large Kurdish and Roma 
communities, such as Ayazma and Sulukule, has been justiied by paternalistic narratives that em-
phasized the implicit otherness of such communities and an aggressive rhetoric that ‘played upon 
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the racist prejudice according to which Kurdishness is equated with political disloyalty, quasi-feudal 
primitivism, general anti-social attitudes and criminality’ (Lovering & Türkmen, 2011, p. 84; Uysal, 
2012, p. 15; Karaman, 2014, p. 293). 
 Finally, it is important to highlight that despite the preemptive disciplining of dissent against 
urban transformation projects, residents and civil society organizations succeeded in mounting 
important challenges. hese mobilizations took the form of legal efforts aimed at chipping away at 
the judicial armour of the projects as well as grassroots movements that brought together residents 
and regional/national civil society organizations to contest the terms of the proposed transforma-
tion. Some of the legal challenges brought about by residents and NGOs have been successful in 
courts, resulting in temporary interruptions to constructions and the partial revision of transfor-
mation plans in neighbourhoods such as Başıbüyük and Tarlabaşı (Lovering & Türkmen, 2011, p. 
91; Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, pp. 1488, 1495). he effectiveness of this strategy has been limited due to 
the previously-discussed legal reforms which have drastically increased the scope of TOKİ’s compe-
tencies, and to the fact that many of those rulings in favour of the projects’ cancellation were later 
annulled by appeal courts. Nevertheless, the legal irewall built around the AKP’s urban transfor-
mation strategy as well as the state’s deployment of its coercive arm to preserve the projects has 
created a mutually reinforcing cycle of grassroots activism. As Tepe (2016, p. 95) notes: 
he administratively nonnegotiable nature of URPs [urban renewal projects] introduces judicial venues 
as one of the most effective ways to contest them…Yet the local governments consistently disregard court 
decisions and reinforce the key role of central and local governments without judicial accountability. 
Paradoxically, the ineffectiveness of court decisions both increases political apathy and mistrust among 
residents as well as makes political activism the only viable option to challenge the URPs. 
herefore, while the extended judicial protection of the urban transformation projects, as well as 
TOKİ’s ability to ignore contravening court decisions, constitute an important barrier to challeng-
ing these developments on legal grounds, the mechanisms of preemptive disciplining also heighten 
the possibility of coordinated grassroots action between residents, NGOs and other political actors 
by, in effect, channelling their opposition to the streets. 
Conclusion 
his article has analyzed the constitution of authoritarian neoliberalism through urban governance 
in Turkey, but the reader should not assume that the processes and practices that underpin the de-
velopments I have discussed are applicable only to questions of urban policy. It is vital to stress that 
the rapid centralization of decision-making processes and the accompanying legal and administra-
tive measures taken in this speciic policy area directly echo similar developments that AKP gov-
ernments have put in motion in other key ields; hence the importance of recognizing them as indi-
vidual nodes of a wider model of governance that I identify as authoritarian neoliberalism. he 
trajectory of administrative reform during the AKP era has followed the same pattern of recentral-
ization in the guise of contingent decentralization. For example, the approach to privatization—the 
pace and value of which have increased dramatically since 2003—reveals an identical tendency for 
‘streamlining’ procedures with a view to removing institutional and regulatory barriers against pri-
vatization (Angın & Bedirhanoğlu, 2013; Tansel, 2017a). As Buğra & Savaşkan (2004, p. 82) have 
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noted, since 2003 AKP governments have amended existing laws and passed new pieces of legisla-
tion which have ‘simpliied bureaucratic procedures, expanded and consolidated prime ministerial 
control over the Privatization Agency and eliminated the rules concerning partial public ownership 
of privatized enterprises’. his wave of regulatory liberalization vis-à-vis privatization initiatives 
went hand in hand with repeated efforts to utilize public procurement procedures to generate and 
further expand circuits of capital accumulation, particularly with a view to reinforcing the status 
and power of pro-government businesses. Loss of discretion and regulatory oversight in public pro-
curement has resulted in ever-increasing market shares of pro-government conglomerates—many 
of them now possess monopolistic powers in key industries, such as in construction and media 
(Yeşil 2016, p. 105). TOKİ itself has played a crucial role in this process, as its investment arm has 
distributed 60% of its procurements to the members of the pro-government Independent Industri-
alists’ and Businessmen’s Association (MÜSİAD) (Çeviker Gürakar, 2016, p. 147). 
 While the speciicities of the Turkish case—the ways in which executive centralization has 
transformed the state’s administrative, legal and coercive apparatuses—require a particular focus on 
the ‘authoritarian’ character of the AKP-led neoliberalization, it is important to note that ‘central-
ization’, in and of itself, has never been antithetical to the operation of actually existing neoliber-
alisms across the globe (see also Cozzolino in this special issue; Clua-Losada & Ribera-Almandoz, 
2017). A brief look at cases ranging from the restructuring of the British state’s welfare provision 
during the New Labour years to the implementation of privatization programmes and bureaucratic 
reform in Mexico in the 1980s reveals that the adoption of neoliberal policies—oten accompanied 
by an explicit discourse on the need to ‘decentralize’ decision-making—has repeatedly resulted in 
the ‘re-centralisation and formalisation of central state power’ (May et al., 2005, p. 704; Aitken, 
1996, p. 25). 
 he exclusionary and anti-democratic tendencies of these processes have been noted by many 
scholars, though in some cases, such propensities were attributed directly to local particularities. 
Noel Castree (2010, p. 199), for example, has suggested that in neoliberal Britain, ‘executive deci-
sionmaking has become increasingly immune to public scrutiny or pressure’ due to ‘some peculiari-
ties of British politics and society’. What the Turkish experience under AKP rule—and, indeed, 
many other cases explored in this special issue—attests is that we now have enough evidence of 
such executive centralizations to link them more systematically to a broader ‘evacuation of capital-
ist democracy’, namely, the increasing failure of the established political forms of capitalism to 
manage the ‘tensions’ between the necessity to safeguard capital accumulation while maintaining a 
healthy level of public legitimacy (Ayers & Saad-Filho, 2015, pp. 605-606). While the implementa-
tions of neoliberalism in different national contexts have had success in offering, albeit temporarily, 
a panacea for the crisis of proitability, the accompanying process of the transformation of gover-
nance has proven itself ill-equipped to resolve the inherent political contradictions of capitalism. 
he AKP-led attempts to expand the scope of commodiication in the Turkish case underlines the 
magnitude of the structural power the state possesses to facilitate these projects, but also the vibrant 
potential of urban processes in broadening the space for collective action and in building concrete 
forms of solidarity from the bottom up to mount an effective resistance against neoliberalization. 
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Notes 
  Gecekondu, the literal translation of which is ‘built overnight’, denotes irregular and illegal housing built 1
without legal authorization, oten on public land.
 Law No. 2985, Official Gazette, 17 March 1984.2
  Law No. 4966, Official Gazette, 7 August 2003.3
  Law No. 5018, Official Gazette, 24 December 2003. See also Marschall et al. (2016, p. 205).4
  Official Gazette, 16 January 2004.5
  Law No. 5162, Official Gazette, 12 May 2004.6
  Law No. 5273, Official Gazette, 15 December 2004. he amount of public land controlled by TOKİ would 7
increase to 110 million m2 by 2011 (Atasoy, 2016, p. 671).
  Law No. 5609, Official Gazette, 28 March 2007.8
  Law No. 5366, Official Gazette, 5 July 2005.9
  Law No. 5216, Official Gazette, 23 July 2004; Law No. 5393, Official Gazette, 13 July 2005.10
  Law No. 5793, Official Gazette, 6 August 2008.11
  Law No. 6292, Official Gazette, 26 April 2012.12
  Law No. 6306, Official Gazette, 31 May 2012.13
  Law No. 5237, Official Gazette, 12 October 2004.14
  ‘Between 2004 and 2008, 11,543 [gecekondu] units in Istanbul were demolished, a record high for any pe15 -
riod’ (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p. 1484).
  he igure includes housing projects constructed for the urban poor, low- and middle-income groups, 16
disaster housing as well as urban renewal projects (i.e. gecekondu transformation projects) and agricultural 
villages (TOKİ, 2016, p. 16).
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